ABSTRACT Traditional construction supply chains suffer from extra delays, costs and information wastages due to information intermediaries. Blockchain, a decentralized infrastructure, can provide irreversibility, undeniableness, uniqueness and anonymity for trades. Hence, we first propose a blockchain-based construction supply chain framework to reduce limitations in traditional ones. However, payment security by blockchain must be guaranteed and token assets in accounts must be protected. Although the loss of private keys will not result in the exposure or the modification of records in blockchain due to merkle root and blockheader hash, fake payments can be generated and all tokens in the accounts controlled by the private keys may be stolen by attackers. Existing approaches towards private-key protections include biometric-basic signature schemes, index-hidden private key designs and post-quantum blockchain schemes. Nevertheless, none of them can recover lost private keys. Therefore, we design a private-key distribution protocol in blockchains to preserve security of private keys with key recovery. Specifically, our scheme not only uses secret sharing to improve possibilities of recovering lost keys but also introduces network protocols to guarantee security of secret share transmission. The proposed scheme is then proven secure and feasible both in theoretical and experimental analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays construction supply chain (CSC) finance grows in importance along with economic globalization, which rapidly increase circulation of capital and expansion of market. It raises a claim on more interdependent relationships (e.g., managements in raw material purchases, logistic transportations, tender managements and so on) among enterprises, suppliers and dealers [1] . Nevertheless, CSC has been suffered from ineffective information transmissions. In traditional CSC modes, information intermediaries takes the role of transferring information, and every two enterprises solely communicate with each other through an information intermediary [2] . Existence of information intermediaries not only ensures fairness, reliability and transparency in trades, but
The associate editor coordinating the review of this article and approving it for publication was Sabu M. Thampi. also leads to long time span, expensive management fees and possible information wastages because of scattered geographical distribution and large amounts of participants [3] , [14] . Lack of a coordinative information platform makes CSC eager for a peer-to-peer structure (e.g., a blockchain-based system) to replace information intermediaries.
Blockchain was first introduced by Satoshi Nakamoto to propose a virtual crypto-currency Bitcoin (BTC) in 2008 [4] , which introduces a decentralized infrastructure to provide irreversibility, undeniableness, uniqueness and anonymity for transactions. Each user in blockchains interacts with each other directly and generates information to be recorded in blockchains. Moreover, the ownerships of records are solely proven by correct private keys, which provides authentications through signatures. Records in blockchains are monitored by all nodes, ensuring non-repudiation and integrity of information. Blockchain's coming out has brought in VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ plentiful other extended applications (e.g., Ethereum (ETH), Ripple (XRP), Bitcoin Cash (BCH) and so on), setting off billions of investments in blockchain applications. Nevertheless, growing value in blockchain industry has brought in increasing security risks. Most owners' addresses, public keys and private keys (PriKeys) are stored in terminals locally, while few are stored in online wallet servers. Therefore, security of ownership is tightly related with PriKeys [8] . For instance, once a PriKey was breached by single point of failure, its ownership can be tampered illegally [5] .
Major security threats about PriKeys include being lost by terminals, being breached by quantum computing attacks and being stolen of by online PriKey generators [6] . Some approaches are to prevent losing PriKeys by hiding them into specific indexes (such as hiding them into plain English text [7] , fractal trees [8] and so on). Some approaches are to defend against quantum computing attacks by redesigning post-quantum blockchain schemes, which involve latticebased signature schemes [10] , double-signature schemes [9] and anti-quantum transaction authentication schemes [11] . However, methods above merely cope with security threats from external attacks. There exist no approaches towards how to prevent losing PriKeys caused by terminals' physical damages (internal attacks) or how to recover lost PriKeys.
Therefore, to mitigate limitations on low information transmission efficiency in CSC modes and unrecovery of PriKeys in blockchains, in this paper we propose a secret-sharingbased private-key protection protocol, which is designed under CSC modes in blockchains. Specifically, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) To avoid centralized-service delays, transmission costs and information wastages in transmission processes, we transplant the basic structure of consortium blockchains and then propose a framework for CSC based on blockchains, where transaction details are recorded in blockchains instead of information intermediaries, ensuring more fairness, reliability and correctness of trades. 2) To reduce common attacking models and help recover lost PriKeys, we introduce a general private-key distribution protocol composed of ten sub-protocols, where each participant memorizes as little information as possible. Moreover, this protocol can be further extended in blockchain-based applications (e.g., our CSC framework). Having introduced the paper, we will briefly review related work in the next section (see Section II). In Section III, we describe the problem formulation and other relevant materials. In Section IV, we present our proposed approach, prior to presenting the evaluation findings in Section V. We conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK A. BLOCKCHAIN
Satoshi Nakamoto primarily introduced blockchain to propose the world's first crypto-currency ''bitcoin'' in 2008 [4] .
Compared with centralized infrastructures, blockchain establishs a consensus mechanism among decentralized s over the Internet. Validators pack a list of transactions into a block. Moreover, blockheader includes a merkle root hash to maintain integrity of transactions, a timestamp to claim each block's generating order, the hash of previous block to confirm chain's architecture and so on. Consensus algorithms (e.g., Proof-of-Work, Proof-of-Stake and Delegated Proof of Stake) select a validator at set intervals to link his block to the previous one. These algorithms not only eliminate doublespending transactions but also ensure transactions visible and reliable. All participants share the same copy of data sets (e.g., account book of crypto-currency) in blockchains, assuring undeniableness and irreversibility of transactions.
B. BLOCKCHAIN ENABLED SUPPLY CHAIN
Yafei Ji et al. concluded two attack scenarios towards cyber supply chains: attack via manufacturer source code or product and attack via vendor remote access [18] . Han Jeong Hugn et al. investigated possible supply chain devevlopments influenced by blockchains, where they concluded trust as the most influential driving factor. Besides, blockchain technologies are highly promising tools on supply chains from following aspects: extended visibility and traceability, supply chain digitalisation and disintermediation, improved data security and smart contracts [13] . Therefore, supply chain managements gain strong potential in blockchains. For example, Yu Cui and Hiroki Idota proposed a decentralized information sharing blockchain system to improve supply chain resilience [14] . Si Chen proposed a blockchain-based supply chain management framework to solve limitations in quality inspections [15] . However, Youness Tribis statistically surveyed current supply chain managements based on blockchains, which illustrates that major researches focus on pharma and food. Except for general discussions without a particular domain, there exist no researches on construction supply chains [12] . Hence, we will first introduce a blockchain-based design particularly in construction supply chain.
C. TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES
Even if blockchain technologies possess preponderances in overcoming shortcomings in supply chains (e.g., extra time cost, expensive management fees and possible information wastages [3] ), they bring in extra weaknesses in security. Pascal Urien analyzed that main challenges among trusted transactions in blockchains include PriKey security and malwares. And he designed a crypto terminal which employs firmware programing and security policies to represent current transaction generators [17] . Beini Zhou discussed security risks brought by online PriKey generators and online crypto-currency wallets [6] . Furthermore, there still exist threats from quantum computers, whose computation abilities can destroy trust policies of consensus algorithms.
Existing approaches towards PriKey protections include: biometric-based signature schemes [19] , index-hidden PriKey designs [7] , [8] and post-quantum blockchain schemes [9] - [11] . [11] . However, these postquantum blockchain schemes cope with quantum computing threats which require new blockchain architectures in telecommunications and digital signatures, decreasing compatibility and extensibility of current blockchains. As concluded above, current approaches can not support recoverability of PriKeys or cope with security threats caused by terminals' physical damages. Hence, existing approaches focus on secret sharing. For instance, Jan Camenisch et al. proposed the first t-out-of-n threshold password-authenticated secret sharing protocol, which is proven secure in the universal composability framework and offers important advantages over property-based definitions [20] . Moreover, Stanislaw Jarecki et al. proposed a Password-Protected Secret Sharing (PPSS) scheme which does not require secure channels or PKI other than in the initialization stage [21] . Considering that schemes above are mainly cope with online bitcoin wallet trust problems, we will extend existing scenario into any bitcoin wallet and then design a secret-sharing-based key protection scheme in blockchain to improve security of PriKeys.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION A. DESIGN PRINCIPLES
We outlined main disadvantages of existing private-key security schemes in Section I and Subsection II-C, which concluded that current approaches can not support recovering lost PriKeys. To enhance both the recoverability of PriKeys and the extensibility of blockchians, we provide three specific design goals listed below:
1) A basic CSC-blockchain mode should be compatible for extensional CSC applications. 2) Local devices should save as less information as possible to prevent single point of failure. 3) Schemes designed for PriKey protection should be compatible and extensible. Goal 1 and Goal 3 put forward requests for basic schemes (designs) which are applicable for extended designs. That is, such a scheme can be further discussed without extensive infrastructures. Goal 2 is proposed to facilitate users' private-key saving challenges. Users can memorize a shorter or meaningful password instead of a meaningless 256-bit PriKey, which leaves extra back-ups in their brain. Moreover, Goal 2 allows users to distribute secret shares in several devices, where even if some shares are stolen or missing, users can recover initial secret from the remaining informations.
B. ADVERSARY MODELS
Noted that considerable devices (e.g., note papers, smart phones, laptops, desktops, brains) suit for storing passwords, we give reasonable assumptions as following: 1) Attackers cannot manage more than 50 percent computing velocities at the same time, making it impossible for more than 50 percent of devices losing their shares meanwhile. 2) Users prefers to generate an as private and safe as possible password in brain and will not leak them out on their initiatives. The design of adversary models depends on attacks. Existing attacking approaches include: vulnerable links, passive attacks, active attacks, cryptography attacks, special network transport protocol attacks, special secret sharing protocol attacks and so on.
In this way, twelve adversary models can be listed, where the former five models attack on the (t, n) secret sharing algorithm and the latter seven models attack on network protocols: Furthermore, the specific descriptions over above adversary models are given in Subsection V-A for better understanding in security analysis.
Taking both principles and adversary models into consideration, we explore a blockchain-based CSC framework and a private-key distribution protocol to defend against above attacking models.
IV. PROPOSED SCHEMES
Before introducing our private-key distribution protocols, we first propose a basic blockchain-based CSC framework to avoid unfairness, unreliability and non-transparency in trades. On the basis of a basic CSC framework, we then introduce a private-key distribution protocol composed of ten sub-protocols to hence recoverability of PriKeys. To simplify descriptions of algorithm in sub-protocols, we introduce ten notations listed in Fig. 3 .
A. A BLOCKCHAIN-BASED CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY CHAIN (CSC) FRAMEWORK
As is shown in Fig 1, suppliers, enterprises and dealers compose three basic entities in traditional construction modes. Enterprises purchase materials from suppliers and market goods through dealers. The whole self-liquidating trade finance process includes pledges of receivable accounts, third party supervisions, project bids and so on, requiring diverse records to be monitored. Thus we introduce blockchains to improve information transmission performances. We outline designs of blocks as below. 1) Block Designs Any block is composed of a blockheader and a block dataset in Table 1 . The block dataset includes detail records and its signatures, while the blockheader includes the block size, the block type, the block version, the merkle root hash of block dataset, the hash of last block and the time-stamp. 2) Entities Considering that enterprises are involved in all information flows, capital flows and logistics processes, we increase functions of enterprises as validators in blockchains. Moreover, other entities (e.g., suppliers, dealers and so on) shall act as recordsenders and regulators. The identity of a entity is a PriKey generated by itself, which is kept as a secret. And the hash of a PriKey is public to all as an identity address. Hence, each entity can sign to any messages through its PriKey while any other identities can verify the validity of a signature through its related identity address. 3) Consensus Mechanisms Any entity sends their records to the enterprise with their signatures. After receiving records, the enterprise verifies the validity of them and digs them into blocks. Blocks will be put into blockchains by enterprises. Finally, each entity store a same copy of all records in blockchains locally, which prevents records from tamper-proofing. Some disadvantages of traditional CSC mode can be solved. For instance, both information wastages caused by scattered geographical distributions and centralized-service delays caused by repeat responses can be eliminated because every entity keeps a same copy of records locally and can refer to any information at any moment. And transmission costs can be avoided because there exist no specific information intermediaries. Furthermore, our framework prevents records from tampering by monitoring records within full participations, thus maintaining the fairness, reliability and safety of trades.
B. PRIVATE-KEY DISTRIBUTION PROTOCOLS
As is mentioned in Fig. 2 , the former five sub-protocols are proposed to generate and send secret shares when the latter five sub-protocols are proposed to recover secret shares and regenerate secrets.
Before describing private-key distribution protocols, we first introduce several notations to simplify symbols. Table 2 lists notations used in these protocols.
1) SUB-PROTOCOL 1: THE SECRET ENCRYPTION (SECRETENC) ALGORITHM
In this sub-protocol, NodeA encrypts its password PWD A through its private key PriKeyA and outputs encrypted ciphertext C.
F. Xiong et al.: Key Protection Scheme Based on Secret Sharing for Blockchain-Based CSC System FIGURE 2. Divisions and notations of ten sub-protocols.
As is shown in (1), ENC : X 1 × X 2 → Y represents any general encryption algorithm (e.g., AES, which is off-the-shelf), where the first input X 1 (here is PWD A ) represents symmetric encryption keys, the second input X 2 (here is PriKey A ) represents plaintexts to be encrypted and the output Y (here is C) represents encrypted ciphertexts. Moreover, m represents the length of PWD A , L represents the length of PriKey A .
Furthermore, in order to prevent attackers' collision conflicts, both the password PWD A and the private key PriKey A can be extended by adding superfluous messages (e.g., NodeA s username USERNAME A , Device ID, memory questions Q1, Q2, Q3, etc.) to initial messages. For example, PWD A can be extended as (PWD A ||USERNAME A ) when PriKey A can be extended as (PriKey A ||Device ID).
2) SUB-PROTOCOL 2: THE SECRET MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION CODE (SECRETMAC) ALGORITHM
During reconstructions in Sub-protocol 9, ciphertext C must be checked for its correctness. To design this, SecretMAC Algorithm in Sub-protocol 2 aims to add some integrity checking information or an integrity check of the share at the end of C. The (2) is listed below. As is shown in (2), Q1 is a memory question chosen by NodeA. MAC represents the integrity checking information to be added at the end of C. Moreover, the output result D is the ''secret'' to be divided into several shares in following sub-protocols.
3) SUB-PROTOCOL 3: THE SECRET SHARE (SECRETSHARE) ALGORITHM Sub-protocol 2 returns ciphertexts with its integrity checking information D to maintain correctness of secrets, while Subprotocol 3 aims to divide D into several shares to provide recoverability for secrets.
First, NodeA chooses a random natural number n to be the number of shares, a random natural number t to be the threshold value (where 0 < t < n) and a random big prime number P (where the length of P = L + L MAC + 1). Then NodeA chooses any (t, n) secret sharing protocol (e.g., Shamir (t, n) protocol, RSA (t, n) protocol, CRT (t, n) protocol, etc) to divide n shares of D. Resulting shares are named after D [1] , D [2] , . . . , D [n] . Details of SecretShare Algorithm are shown in Algorithm 1:
After generating Algorithm 1, NodeA sends all secret shares
In Algorithm 1, n and t are determined by current measured network state and system design parameters according to the Node Detection Protocol (P1) in Sub-protocol 5. Moreover, as Goal 2 in Section III requested, P shall be stored locally as a sysytem parameter.
Algorithm 1 The SecretShare Algorithm
Input: D, t, n, C, P, where t, n ∈ N , 1 ≤ t < n, P is a random big prime number with
4) SUB-PROTOCOL 4: THE SHARE ENCRYPTION (SHAREENC) AND THE SHARE MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION CODE (SHAREMAC) ALGORITHM
Considering that ''secret'' D has been divided into n shares in Sub-protocol 3, the next step is to distribute these shares to NodeB[i]s. However, to avoid attackers spying on transportation channels to filch shares, we design Sub-protocol 4 to defend against it. 
Algorithm 2 The
In Algorithm 2, NodeA uses the same encryption function ENC as that in Sub-protocol 1. Moreover, considering that the output length of hash function Hash may be longer than the length of first input in function ENC, NodeA should cut partial bit-streams from the output of Hash to match ENC s input. Besides, as Goal 2 in Section III requested, NodeA shall store ShareKey dynamically. In other words, ShareKey should be generated in real time during Algorithm 2 and be destroyed as soon as it finishes.
5) SUB-PROTOCOL 5: THE NODE DETECTION AND SHARE ENCRYPTION TRANSPORT PROTOCOL (P1)
P1 is a three-round protocol which includes a Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Protocol, a node-detecting protocol and a share encryption transport protocol.
First (7), (8), (9) and (10):
where is a random number which represents a random key to protect PWD A from brute-force attacks. Besides, should not stored in terminals of NodeA.
where α is a random number between 1 and q (α ∈ (1, q]) and must be stored in terminals of NodeA.
PairwiseKey[A, B[j]] = g Hash(PriKey B[j] )·Hash(PWD
where j is a random number between 1 and n (j ∈ [1, n] 
ENC(SessionKey[A, B[i]], ENC(PairwiseKey[A, B[j]], E[i]))

After receiving ENC(SessionKey, ENC(PairwiseKey [A, B[j]], E[I ])), NodeB[i] decrypts ENC(PairwiseKey[A, B[j]], E[I ]) with SessionKey.
Because of requests in Goal 2 in Section III, NodeB[i] should store ENC(PairwiseKey[A, B[j]], E[I ]),
g Hash(PWD A )+ modP and g Hash(PWD A )+α· modP locally to make verifications for share holders in Sub-protocol 6.
FIGURE 3. Transferring in P1.
As is shown in Fig. 3 , in order to improve transferring efficiency, NodeB[i]s shall repeat sending response packages to NodeA. Then NodeA chooses to resend SND or not.
6) SUB-PROTOCOL 6: THE SHARE RECOVERERY ENCRYTION TRANSPORT PROTOCOL (P2)
In order to retrieve t valid shares, we need to design an interactive protocol P2 to for NodeB[i] to verify NodeA s Identification. P2 is a four-round protocol, whose functions include share-recovery request RCR and share-return reply RTN . The design of P2 is based on Zero-knowledge Proof (ZkP) to prove the ownership of PWD without leaking any details about it. Moreover, P2 adopts the design idea of Schnorr Identification Protocol.
The procedures are shown in Algorithm 4 and the details are as below: 1) NodeA first figures out a commit which represents a one-off session key for negotiation.
where r is a dynamic nonce which will be destroyed after P2 finishes and g is Sub-protocol 5 s element of order q in Z p . Then NodeA figures out a challenge for Nodeb [i] as an intermediate variable.
where RCR ID represents a integer nonce at the length of 24 bits. On the basis of (13) the session key in Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Protocol. Fig. 4 
NodeA can decrypt ENC(SessionKey[A, B[i]], ENC (PairwiseKey[A, B[i]], E[i])) to get
ENC(PairwiseKey[A, B[i]], E[i])
If the answer is yes, D turns out to be correct. Therefore, C is the former length of L bit strings in D.
10) SUB-PROTOCOL 10: THE SECRET DECRYPTION (SECRETDEC) ALGORITHM
Since Sub-protocol 9 reconstructs C, NodeA can uses his password PWD A to decrypt C and returns PriKey A , where the decryption function DEC is corresponding to the encryption function ENC in Sub-protocol 1.
We introduced twelve adversary models in Subsection III-B from the aspects of possible attacks in brief. And the former five models attack on (t, n) secret sharing algorithms (A) when the latter seven models attack on network protocols (B).
Here we give specific introductions to these adversary models and analyze the security of our schemes.
1) ATTACKS ON (t , n) SECRET SHARING ALGORITHMS
Attacks on (t, n) secret sharing algorithms are composed of five models below. Since there exist no professional definitions towards following attack models, we first give specific definitions to introduce them and then prove that our schemes can defend against these attacks.
1) Compromise Attacks
Definition: A private-key share-holder node (NodeB[i]) conducts a single-node defect. In other words, captured NodeB attempts to infer PriKey A through his own share. Proof: Such an attacker merely possesses an encrypted single share without its corresponding decrypted share. The probability of speculation is 1 2 m , where m = |PWD A |. Moreover, even if the decrypted share is speculated, this attacker can not recover PriKey A because of (t, n) secret sharing recovery algorithm. This algorithm requests that PriKey A can not VOLUME 7, 2019 be recovered until at least t correct shares are collected. Therefore, the possibility of attack-successfully rate is 1 2 L , whose limit approaches to 0. Hence, our proposed schemes can defend against Compromise Attack.
2) Collusion Attacks
Definition: All private-key share-holder nodes (NodeB[i]s) collude to defect completely. That is to say, the Byzantine failure occurs to speculate PriKey A . Proof: All shares are encrypted by ShareKey which is merely known by NodeA. So even if all NodeB[i]s are compromised, they only possess the encrypted shares instead of the decrypted ones. In this way, the security of PriKey A depends on that of ShareKey. Moreover, ShareKey depends on PWD A , regulating the security of ShareKey to that of PWD A tightly. Furthermore, the encryption algorithm ENC proposes that the security of PriKey A is also reduced to the security of PWD A . Therefore, if PWD A is secure (which has already been assumed in Subsection III-B), ShareKey is secure and the encrypted share cannot be decrypted. Consequently, Collusion Attack is invalid towards our proposed schemes.
3) History Analysis Attack
Definition 
10) Combination Attack
Definition: Such an attack combine above attack models together.
Proof: Since we have proved that above attack models are invalid for our schemes, no matter how this attack combines others can we confirm its invalidity.
11) DDoS Attack
Proof: If a malicious node attempts to modify loads in RTN , our proposed schemes can verify the correctness of RTN through MAC [i] , which can avoid NodeA from using wrong shares to reconstruct ''secret'', so as to minimize times of reconstruction calculation. Therefore, our proposed scheme can reduce harm caused by DDoS Attacks.
12) Sybil Attack
Proof: Even if the node changes its IP address frequently, no additional loss will be caused because NodeA merely require a sufficient number of IP addresses instead of all of that to return their correct shares.
B. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 1) PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
Main performance indicators include communication performance and computing performance. However, both communication delays and computing powers can be ignored here. The former reason is that in most cases communication process does not directly affect the user experience while the latter reason is that there hardly exist low-power consumption devices on secret sharing technologies. Moreover, the storage costs are also out of consideration because current devices are cheap.
2) ANALYSIS
For better performances in interactions, we shall minimize four main indicators in interaction rounds, encryption and decryption calculations, size of protocol packages and semantics.
1) Minimum number of interaction rounds In our schemes, P1 is a 3-round protocol when P2 is a 2-round protocol. And both network transmission costs and latency of them are low. To begin with, traditional Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Protocol requires at least 2 rounds. However, P1 cannot be changed to a 2-round protocol unless shares cannot be transferred. Therefore, P1 already reaches its minimum round number protocol. Moreover, P2 cannot be changed to a one-round protocol because its functions must include zero-knowledge authentication, key negotiation and data transfer, which allows 2 to be the minimum round of P2. Consequently, both P1 and P2 have reached minimum number of interaction rounds.
2) Minimum encryption and decryption calculations
On the basis of security, times of encryption calculation have been minimized.
3) Minimum size of protocol packages The package designs in P1 and P2 reach the minimum size of package without the premise of security and semantic clarity, so as to minimize both network transmission costs and transmission delays.
4) Minimum semantics
As single semantic protocols, both P1 and P2 have reached minimum semantics.
3) RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
Assume Table 3 . 
4) SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The probability of reconstruction in (25) illustrates relationships among p, m and t, thus allowing us to analyze it numerically. Firstly, we separately set p m ∈ {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1} as a fixed proportion and then simulate probability-variation trends resulting from m and t in Fig. 5 .
Secondly, we set t p = 1 and then simulate probabilityvariation trends resulting from p and m in Fig. 6 . Furthermore, we wonder that if it is feasible to rely on multiple reconstructions and majority voting schemes to replace integrity verifications. Therefore, security analysis is conducted as following.
Assume that 2 < t ≤ m, Therefore, in order to test the minimum value of x, we conduct numerical analysis in Fig. 7 .
5) EXPERIMENT RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
We separately tested time costs of generating shares from the secret (GenSha)and reconstructing the secret from shares (RecSec) under different (t, n) parameters.
System Parameters:
• The language environment of codes: Java.
• The computing platform: Android 6.0.1, Nubia z11minis, Qualcomm Snapdragon 625MSM8953, CPU frequency 2.0ghz, core number of eight cores, Qualcomm Adreno506 GPU model, 4GB RAM. Experiment results are listed in Table 4 . Results in Table 4 show that orders of magnitude in delays are millisecond. Therefore, our proposed scheme is feasible. 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a secret-sharing-based key protection scheme for blockchain. We not only designed a basic CSC framework to solve disadvantages of traditional CSC modes (such as extra delays, transmission costs and information wastages) but also introduced a private-key distribution method to help recover lost private keys. Our scheme can defend against both attacks on secret sharing algorithms and attacks on network protocols theoretically. Furthermore, the interaction performances of our scheme are proven to be optimized. And real experiments illustrate that time costs in our scheme can be ignored since the orders of magnitude in delays are millisecond. The scheme can be used in any general scenarios where private keys need to be protected. 
